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(Agency No. A079-616-884) 
 Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Ho-Sue petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying his applications for discretionary cancellation of removal under 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  But because Ho-Sue is removable as an alien convicted of a controlled 
substance offense, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of 
law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D).  To the extent that Ho-Sue raises constitutional 
or legal issues, his arguments lack merit.  We will accordingly deny his petition for 
review.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 Ho-Sue is a citizen of Jamaica who first arrived in the United States in 2000 and 
eventually became a legal permanent resident.  In 2011, he was convicted in 
Pennsylvania on charges of conspiracy and possession with intent to deliver marijuana.  
See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903(a)(1) (2018); 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(30) (West 2018).  He was sentenced to nine months to five years in prison and 
was ultimately credited for time served of 1,478 days.  As a result of the convictions, 
removal proceedings were initiated in 2013, and an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ultimately 
found that Ho-Sue was removable as both an alien convicted of a controlled substance 
offense, and as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
 Ho-Sue subsequently filed an application for deferral of removal under the CAT.  
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In support of the application, Ho-Sue stated that he had been threatened by lottery 
scammers in Jamaica after one of his ex-girlfriends, Lisa Parvaiz, had stolen $25,000 
from them.  According to Ho-Sue, the police in Jamaica were paid off by the scammers 
and deliberately avoided arresting the group’s leaders.  Ho-Sue blamed the scammers for 
the 2008 shooting death of his cousin, and he claimed that someone had approached his 
mother when she was in Jamaica to say that her son would be killed if he ever returned to 
Jamaica.  Ho-Sue said that he believed these threats to be credible and that he feared his 
life would be in danger if he ever went back.   
 The IJ found Ho-Sue’s testimony credible, but nonetheless denied the CAT 
application.  The IJ reasoned that Ho-Sue had not established how his cousin’s killing 
had anything to do with him.  More importantly, despite the threats Ho-Sue had 
apparently received, he had returned to Jamaica for his cousin’s funeral and suffered no 
harm.  The IJ also concluded that Ho-Sue had failed to establish that the Jamaican 
authorities would acquiesce or willfully turn a blind eye to any non-governmental actors 
that might subject him to violence.  To the contrary, there was evidence that Jamaican 
authorities had actively attempted to combat lottery scammers.  Thus, Ho-Sue had not 
met his burden of showing that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured with 
the acquiescence of the Jamaican government.   
 Following the denial of Ho-Sue’s CAT application, the IJ dismissed the 
aggravated felony ground for removal, which made Ho-Sue eligible for discretionary 
cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Ho-Sue filed a cancellation 
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application within weeks, and the IJ conducted a hearing, at which both Ho-Sue and his 
wife, Shamika, testified.  During his testimony, Ho-Sue acknowledged his convictions 
but maintained his innocence, claiming that witnesses had lied about him at his trial.  
Shamika, whom Ho-Sue had recently married while serving his prison sentence for the 
marijuana convictions, testified that she had known Ho-Sue for twelve years and that 
their relationship had produced a now nine-year-old son.  Shamika added that she had 
five other children from a previous relationship, all of whom loved Ho-Sue and 
considered him their father.  She further testified that Pervaiz had contacted her on 
multiple occasions threatening to kill Ho-Sue if he ever returned to Jamaica.  Out of fear 
of Pervaiz, Shamika said that she and her children would not follow Ho-Sue to Jamaica if 
he was removed there.   
 The IJ decided to grant Ho-Sue’s application.  While acknowledging the lack of 
corroborating evidence, the IJ found both Ho-Sue and Shamika to be credible.  Although 
the IJ expressly refused to condone Ho-Sue’s criminal record, he ultimately concluded 
that Ho-Sue’s role as a father figure to six children warranted discretionary relief.   
 The BIA disagreed, however.  Considering both the denial of the CAT application 
and the grant of the discretionary cancellation application, the Board concluded that Ho-
Sue was entitled to neither form of relief.  With respect to the cancellation application, 
the BIA gave less weight to Ho-Sue’s family ties, explaining that Ho-Sue’s contact with 
and support for his step-children must necessarily have been limited due to his extended 
time in prison.  The Board then gave more weight to Ho-Sue’s criminal record, stressing 
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that Ho-Sue still had not accepted responsibility for his crimes but instead maintained his 
innocence—despite the fact that five pounds of marijuana were found in his bedroom and 
eighty-seven pounds were found in a car parked in his driveway.  “Given the nature and 
seriousness of the . . . crime, and [Ho-Sue’s] unwillingness to accept responsibility for his 
actions,” the Board concluded that he had “not demonstrated any meaningful 
rehabilitative potential” that would justify cancellation of removal as a matter of 
discretion.  A.R. 5.  It therefore reversed the IJ’s order.   
 Regarding the CAT application, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Ho-Sue’s 
connection to his cousin’s killing was speculative and that his return to Jamaica for the 
funeral cast doubt on the validity of the scammers’ threats.  It also agreed that evidence 
showed that Jamaican authorities investigate and attempt to combat lottery scamming.  
Thus, Ho-Sue could not meet his burden under the Convention.  The BIA accordingly 
sustained the IJ’s CAT decision and reinstated the order of removal.  Ho-Sue then filed a 
petition for review with this Court.   
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Because Ho-Sue is removable by virtue of a controlled 
substance conviction, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of 
law.1  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D).  We review such issues de novo.  Guzman v. Att’y 
                                                 
1 To the extent that Ho-Sue is challenging the BIA’s denial of his application for 
cancellation of removal, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional and legal questions by 
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Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 2014).   
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Discretionary Cancellation of Removal Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) 
 In challenging the BIA’s denial of his cancellation application, Ho-Sue appears to 
make two different legal arguments, both of which focus on the evidence that the BIA 
relied upon in reversing the IJ.  First, he contends that the BIA committed legal error by 
considering facts that led to his arrest but not to his ultimate conviction.  Second, he 
argues that the Board engaged in impermissible factfinding by citing an affidavit of 
probable cause that had not been expressly mentioned in the IJ’s written decision.   
 With regard to the first argument, Ho-Sue contends that the BIA should not have 
considered the eighty-seven pounds of marijuana that were found in the car parked in his 
driveway because, at his criminal trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the 
charge of possession of marijuana in an automobile and a mistrial was declared on that 
count.   
 The legal authority underlying this contention is unclear, however.  Ho-Sue frames 
his argument as a due process claim, but we have held that aliens have no due process 
liberty interest in being considered for discretionary relief because such relief is “a matter 
of grace rather than of right.”  See United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104–06 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The traditional rules of evidence are also inapplicable in immigration 
                                                 
an additional provision: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars review of the agency’s 
discretionary determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.   
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proceedings, and “arrest reports historically have been admissible in such proceedings.”  
Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996).  Indeed, “there is no per se bar to the agency’s 
consideration of hearsay-laden police reports where convictions have not followed.”  
Arias-Minaya v. Holder, 779 F.3d 49, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Paredes-Urrestarazu 
v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir. 1994); Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 
1985)).  And “in the context of determining whether an alien warrants discretionary relief 
from removal, the fact of an arrest and its attendant circumstances . . . may have 
probative value in assessing his character (and, thus, his suitability for discretionary 
relief).”  Id. at 54.   
 To the extent there are—despite the lack of cognizable constitutional protection—
any limits on the BIA’s ability to consider the circumstances surrounding Ho-Sue’s 
arrest, we think they are inapplicable here.  Ho-Sue has failed to explain how the 
evidence the BIA considered is in any way unreliable.  To the contrary, Ho-Sue’s 
criminal defense counsel signed a stipulation of facts acknowledging that the eighty-
seven pounds of marijuana were in fact found in the car parked in Ho-Sue’s driveway.  
Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that the BIA somehow committed legal error 
by considering that drug quantity in determining whether Ho-Sue was entitled to 
discretionary relief—despite the fact that no conviction resulted.  To the extent Ho-Sue 
takes issue with the weight that the BIA gave this particular evidence, we are without 
jurisdiction to review that discretionary determination.  See Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 
F.3d 166, 170–71 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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 Ho-Sue next argues that the BIA erred by referencing an affidavit of probable 
cause that had not been expressly mentioned in the IJ’s written decision.  It is true that the 
BIA may not “engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals,” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), but the BIA did not do so here.  In its written decision, the IJ had 
already acknowledged that Ho-Sue’s criminal record was a relevant consideration, and it 
had observed that the eighty-seven pounds of marijuana had been found in the car outside 
of his home, in addition to the roughly five pounds found in his bedroom.  The BIA 
subsequently repeated these facts in its opinion, and then added in a footnote that “[a]n 
affidavit of probable cause contained in the conviction records states that [Ho-Sue] was 
involved in the trafficking of large quantities of marijuana and an associate made 
multiple trips on behalf of the respondent to pick up as much as 200 pounds of marijuana 
at a time.”  A.R. 5.  Importantly, the “conviction records” to which the BIA referred were 
the same records that were submitted to the IJ when it was considering Ho-Sue’s 
application.  Indeed, the affidavit of probable cause was a part of the same exhibit that the 
IJ cited when it referenced the various drug quantities.   
 Thus, in essence, the IJ made a factual finding regarding Ho-Sue’s criminal record 
based on the documentary evidence before it, and it summarized that evidence in its 
written decision.  The BIA then looked at the same evidence and mentioned a particular 
piece of information that the IJ did not reference in its summary of the evidence.  We do 
not think the prohibition on factfinding bars the BIA from employing such reasoning 
when it weighs the various considerations.  In fact, when it reverses the IJ, “[t]he BIA 
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must show that it reviewed the record and considered the evidence upon which the IJ 
relied, and it must explain why the record warrants a different conclusion than the one 
reached by the IJ.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 387 (3d Cir. 2010).  In other 
words, the factfinding bar must provide the BIA some room to explain itself when it 
disagrees with the IJ.  Here, the IJ had already observed that Ho-Sue’s criminal record 
was a relevant factor, and the BIA merely cited documentary evidence that was in the 
record and available to the IJ during its initial review.  Under these circumstances, we are 
unpersuaded that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding.  Accordingly, we will 
deny Ho-Sue’s petition for review of the BIA’s order denying his application for 
discretionary cancellation of removal.   
B. Deferral of Removal under the CAT 
 In assessing Ho-Sue’s CAT claim, we review both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions 
to the extent that the BIA relied upon the IJ’s findings in its decision.  See Guzman, 770 
F.3d at 1082 (“Where ‘the BIA adopts and affirms the decision of the IJ, as well as 
provides its own reasoning,’ we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions.”) (quoting 
Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008)).  To be eligible for relief under 
the CAT, Ho-Sue must establish that he would more likely than not be subject to torture 
if removed to Jamaica.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  “For an act to constitute torture under 
the [CAT] and the implementing regulations, it must be: (1) an act causing severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or 
proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
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public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from 
lawful sanctions.”  Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
 Ho-Sue argues that the BIA and the IJ erred in concluding that he failed to 
establish that the Jamaican government would acquiesce to any harm he would suffer.  
He contends that both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions were grounded in the proposition 
that the Jamaican government could not be acquiescent because it takes measures to 
combat lottery scamming.  This premise, Ho-Sue contends, is inconsistent with 
Pieschacon-Villegas v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 2011), in which we 
held that “an applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the government 
opposes the . . . organization that is engaged in torturous acts.”  See also Gomez-Zuluaga 
v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 351 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The mere fact that the . . . government 
is engaged in a protracted civil war with the [alleged torturers] does not necessarily mean 
that it cannot remain willfully blind to [their] torturous acts . . . .”).   
 Ho-Sue’s argument fails for two reasons.  First, in concluding that Ho-Sue had 
failed to meet his burden on the acquiescence question, neither the BIA nor the IJ relied 
solely on the fact that the Jamaican government opposes lottery scammers.  Instead, they 
each acknowledged that Ho-Sue had presented evidence of police corruption, but 
ultimately concluded that Ho-Sue’s evidence was nonetheless insufficient to prove that 
the government would be acquiescent or willfully blind.  Importantly, neither the BIA nor 
the IJ made the kind of “unqualified statement[]” that we found problematic in 
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Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d at 311.  They did not say or suggest that an applicant 
could never prove acquiescence or willful blindness when a government takes measures 
to combat alleged tortures.  They simply evaluated all of the relevant evidence and 
concluded that Ho-Sue could not meet his burden.   
 Second, even if Ho-Sue could meet his burden on the acquiescence issue, both the 
BIA and the IJ concluded in the alternative that Ho-Sue failed to establish that it was 
more likely than not that he would, if removed, suffer harm rising to the level of torture—
that is, an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering, see Myrie, 855 F.3d at 
515.  Indeed, both the BIA and the IJ reasoned that Ho-Sue’s connection to his cousin’s 
killing was speculative and that Ho-Sue had been able to return to Jamaica without being 
hurt.  Accordingly, even if the BIA and IJ had committed legal error on the acquiescence 
question, Ho-Sue still would not be eligible for relief under the CAT.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Ho-Sue’s petition for review.   
